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I. Why Study the Problem.
For the average person, the word Spain usually brings to mind 
such images as sunny landscapes sprinkled with white stucco houses, 
gayly-dressed flamenco dancers, and handsome, courageous bullfighters. 
For the more politically-minded person, modern Spain might represent a 
newly emerging democracy, finally released from the nearly forty-year 
repression of dictator Francisco Franco. Although these impressions are 
not totally without merit, I came to realize after five months living in 
Madrid as an exchange student, that Spain is much more diverse, cosmo­
politan, and politically undecided than outsiders realize. Contrary to 
popular belief, all Spaniards do not take a siesta daily, nor do they all 
enjoy the bullfights, nor do they all agree that the present form of gov­
ernment Is the best one for Spain. Although Franco's denial of political 
participation sharply contrasts with democratic beliefs and values, for 
some Spaniards this sacrifice was worth the added security and economic 
prosperity they felt the Franco regime provided.
This view was first expressed to me by the forty-eight year old 
Spanish woman with whom I lived. Her apartment was located in one of 
the wealthiest sections of Madrid and was filled with nice furniture and 
paintings, yet she had to take in borders to help pay the bills. She of­
ten lamented that she had grown up during the Franco era with servants 
and fine clothing but now, as a widow, she had to seek out ways to earn
2money just to keep up with the ever-increasing cost of living. She not 
only missed the luxuries of the past, but also the greater security of the 
streets during Franco's rule. She recalled that at that time people would 
wear furs and jewels in public, both during the day and at night, without 
fear of being robbed. Now she and her friends only carry minimal amounts 
of money or valuables because, according to them, it simply is not as safe 
anymore.
These feelings of dissatisfaction with the present situation in Spain 
were also expressed by other Spaniards of similar age and background.
More than once I was told that if the leader of the right-wing party, called 
Alianza Popular, was not so closely associated with Franco, that this party 
would gain much more widespread support, and perhaps even win a major­
ity in the Cortes (Parliament). If this were to occur, it seems possible 
that some fundamental changes would take place, including the reversal 
of some of the more liberal reforms that have been enacted under the socia­
list government of Felipe Gonzalez.
Perhaps these views were simply those of a disgruntled minority 
who were once wealthy and now are not. However, perhaps these insights 
are more significant and point toward a more general trend of lack of sup­
port for the current form of government. That issue is the crux of this 
investigation. For if there truly is increasing unrest and dissatisfaction 
with the constitutional monarchy and the democratic institutions which sup­
port It, Spain's political future could be vastly different from the liberal 
democratic path it has followed in the ten years since Franco's death.
3II. What Public Opinion Polls Say About the Problem.
Since the question under investigation is one of popular support 
for the current regime of a constitutional monarchy, and the democratic 
institutions which are a part of this regime, public opinion surveys are 
are a vital source of information for this study. Moreover, surveys tak­
en during the last years of Franco's rule in combination with those done 
more recently would give an indication of the evolution of this support. 
Unfortunately, no single survey was found spanning such a period of 
time* However, several individual series of opinion polls, dating from 
196$ to 1973, from 1978 to 1980, and from 1983 to 1985, were available. 
Although each series asks different questions, general trends regarding 
popular views of such concepts as democracy, authoritarianism, and uni­
versal suffrage can be detected. A detailed examination of these polls, 
in chronological order, will more clearly reveal this.
POLLS TAKEN DURING THE FRANCO ERA
The Franco regime, which lasted from 1939 until 1975, was vast­
ly different from the constitutional monarchy now in power. Although 
this will be discussed later in more detail, it is important to note that 
such vital elements of democracy as elections and parties simply did not 
exist during this time. Franco’s rule was a dictatorship in the most 
basic sense of the word and his authority remained unquestioned until 
his death. In light of this situation, the first question of interest is, 
was this authoritarian regime accepted by the masses, or did they yearn
4for a more democratic form of government? Surveys taken between I960 
and 1973 reveal that although authoritarianism was generally preferred, 
it was not by an overwhelming majority. The percentages of those in 
favor of authoritarianism were 39% in i960, 54% in 1968, 52% in 1969, and 
46% in 1973. The distributions of those favoring democracy were 38% in 
I960, 35% in 1966, 47% in 1968 and 39% in 1973.2 Thus, there was a basis 
of support for democracy dating as far back as over ten years before 
Franco's death.
The support for a non-authoritarian form of government seemed 
even stronger in polls in which respondents were classified by their level 
of education or by the size of the city in which they lived (see tables I 
and 2). In a 1966 survey in which Spaniards with various amounts of ed­
ucation were asked whether they would prefer an authoritarian govern­
ment or simply a system of government with control, respondents in all 
categories chose the latter option. It should be noted however, that 
those with more education were more strongly in favor of this choice 
than those with little or no education. Similar results occurred when the 
question was posed to inhabitants of rural, semi-urban, and urban areas. 
All three categories polled chose the system of government with control 
rather than the authoritarian form. But those from the urban areas 
showed the strongest support for this option.
5TABLE I. TYPE OF GOVERNMENT PREFERRED ACCORDING TO LEVEL 
OF EDUCATION ( 1966)3
Level of Education System of government 
with control
Authoritarian
government
No
answer
More than primary/ 
knows how to read 
and write
25 % 8 1 67 %
Less than primary/ 
doesn't know how to 
read or write
9 4 87
Primary education 40 14 46
Secondary education 58 18 24
Middle grade technician/ 
Junior College Graduate 78 !4 8
Superior grade technician/ 
University Graduate 64 23 13
Others 62 — 38
TABLE II. TYPE OF GOVERNMENT PREFERRED ACCORDING TO PLACE 
OF RESIDENCE (I966)4
System of government Authoritarian No
with control government answer
Rural zone: up to 2000 
inhabitants 31 % 9 1 60 %
Semi-urban zone: 2001- 
50,000 inhabitants 28 II 61
Urban zone: 50,000+ 
inhabitants 45 13 42
After determining the level of support for democracy, or In the case 
of the second set of surveys, the percentages of those in favor of a non­
6authoritarian government, the next question would be, specifically, what 
form of government the Spanish people would prefer. This question was 
posed to a broad range nf Spaniards in 1970, at which time it had already 
been decided that Spain would become a monarchy after Franco's death. 
Therefore, it is rather surprising that in ail categories, except for high 
school students, and blue collar workers, the largest plurality of respon­
dents were in favor of a republic (see table 3). This evidence of support 
for a republic was further substantiated by another 1970 survey in which 
the participants were divided into three age categories: under 35, 36-50, 
and 51 or over. When asked to identify which government form they fa­
vored, the largest percentages in all three age brackets chose a republic.5 
Thus, in addition to there being support for democracy, there also seems 
to be a preference for the republic as a form of government, rather than 
a constitutional monarchy, in this late stage of the Franco regime.
TABLE III. FORM OF GOVERNMENT PREFERRED (I970)6
White Blue
High School University Lawyers Doctors Collar Collar 
Options Students Students Workers Workers
Same as present
(Franco) form 39 % 1 % 8 % 20 % 37 % 55 %
Regency 3 4 5 9 6 4
Bourbon Monarchy II II 23 8 5 5
Cerlist Monarchy 3 3 - - 1 1 -
Monarchy (general) 5 5 10 19 7 6
Republic 38 76 53 43 45 30
Although it appears through these surveys that Spaniards were 
showing more liberal tendencies during this era, public sentiment toward 
democratic institutions must still be determined, for it is these institutions
6authoritarian government, the next question would be, specifically, what 
form of government the Spanish people would prefer. This question was 
posed to a broad range of Spaniards in 1970, at which time it had already 
been decided that Spain would become a monarchy after Franco's death. 
Therefore, it is rather surprising that in all categories, except for high 
school students, and blue collar workers, the largest plurality of respon­
dents were in favor of a republic (see table 3). This evidence of support 
for a republic was further substantiated by another 1970 survey in which 
the participants were divided into three age categories: under 35, 36-50,
and 51 or over. When asked to identify which government form they fa-
5
vored, the largest percentages in ail three age brackets chose a republic. 
Thus, in addition to there being support for democracy, there also seems 
to be a preference for the republic as a form of government, rather than 
a constitutional monarchy, in this late stage of the Franco regime.
TABLE III. FORM OF GOVERNMENT PREFERRED (I970)6
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High School University Lawyers Doctors Collar Collar 
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Although it appears through these surveys that Spaniards were 
showing more liberal tendencies during this era, public sentiment toward 
democratic institutions must still be determined, for it is these institutions
7which give form and substance to a generally liberal approach to govern­
ment. For example, support for the existence of multiple political parties 
would be evidence of the institutionalization of the democratic political at­
titude emerging at that time in Spain. However, the surveys available do 
not offer conclusive evidence of such support. One poll taken in 1969 in­
dicated broad support for multiple parties, with the option of two parties 
also winning much favor.7 Vet, when a similar poll was conducted in 1973, 
only 23 % were in favor of allowing multiple parties and 61 % preferred
o
Franco's system of just one national party.
When the respondents were categorized according to their level of 
education and the size of the municipality in which they resided, the re­
sults were equally as inconclusive. In the 1970 survey done in terms of 
level of education, those with a high school degree chose a multiple party 
system, and those without a degree preferred the system of a single na­
tional party in almost equal proportions. In the survey based on place of 
residence, the respondents living in larger cities opted for multiple parties 
more often, whereas those polled in smaller towns tended to prefer the sin­
gle party system (see tables 4 and 5). This lack of consistency of sup­
port for a multi-party system is significant in that parties are a vital ele­
ment of any democratic regime. However, at this point it could also be 
hypothesized that there was not more widespread support for a multi-party 
system simply because it was not allowed under Franco, and therefore 
little information concerning its advantages and disadvantages was avail­
able to the general public.
8TABLE I*. PARTY SYSTEM PREFERENCE ACCORDING TO LEVEL OF 
EDUCATION (I970)9
Education Current One Party System Multiple Party Syatem
High School Degree 33 % 61 %
No High School Degree 67 38
TABLE 5. PARTY SYSTEM PREFERENCE ACCORDING TO PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE (I970)10
Size of Municipality Current One Party Syatem Multiple Party System
More than 200,000
inhabitants 23 % 43 I
60,000-200,000
inhabitants 16 18
10.000- 50,000
inhabitants 23 19
2 . 000-  10,000
inhabitants 24 15
up to 2,000
inhabitants 13 5
Surveys determining popular support of such democratic institutions as 
elections and parliamentary bodies were not available for this time period. 
Some surveys were found, however, which investigated public attitudes 
toward the basic democratic right of liberty of expression. These polls 
are important in that this right is the underlying principle of most demo­
cratic institutions, and therefore support of this liberty might indicate 
greater favor toward the institutions themselves. Yet, according to polls 
conducted in 1966, liberty of expression was only preferred by a small mar­
gin, if at all. When asked whether there should be control exerted over 
the written word, 408 of those questioned believed in liberty of opinion,
9but 35% favored control.1* The ratio> were similar when those surveyed 
were divided according to their age. The younger and middle-aged re­
spondents tended to favor liberty of opinion, but not by much. Moreover, 
those participants 47 years or older favored control by I % (see Table 6). 
Thus, just as support for a multiple party system was not consistent, sup­
port for freedom of expression, which is an underlying concept of democra­
cy, was also inconsistent and ambiguous.
TABLE 6. VIEW OF LIBERTY OF EXPRESSION ACCORDING TO AGE (I966)12
Generation Liberty of opinion Control No Answer
21-27 years 
(Born after 1939) 53 % 35 % 12 %
28-46 years
(Born between 1920-38) 44 34 22
47 years +
(Born before 1920) 35 36 29
In summary, the polls taken between 1966 and 1973 do not show 
overwhelming support for the Franco system of government, nor do they 
indicate a consensus for the institution of a more democratic regime. Be­
ing a very traditional society, it is not surprising that the Spaniards did 
not want to immediately abandon th* authoritarian system Franco had pro­
vided for nearly forty years. An examination of polls taken in the post- 
Franco era will reveal whether the traditional, non-progressive view pre­
vailed after Franco's death, or whether more liberal attitudes gained great­
er popularity and truly took root In Spanish society.
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POST-FRANCO POLLS
The transition of leadership from Franco to King Juan Carlos, and 
thus the transition of the Spanish form of government from a dictatorship 
to a consitutional monarchy, took place smoothly and without bloodshed. In 
fact, scholars often marvel at the relatively uneventful transformation of an 
authoritarian rule, which lasted nearly forty years, into a modern, liberal, 
democratic regime. Yet the question still remains whether the democritiza- 
tion of the Spanish people has taken place so easily and so completely.
Does a lack of broad rebellion necessarily signify that Spaniards fully accept 
and support the post-Franco form of government?
In order to answer this question wo must again examine the basic 
issue of support among the Spanish people for democracy as a political sys­
tem. In a series of polls conducted between December 1983 and November 
1985, democracy was labelled as "good11 by u strong majority of Spaniards,
whereas only a fraction of the respondents felt democracy was "average" or 
13"bad". One interesting outcome of this survey however, was that when
those polled were grouped according to their party affiliation, members of
the Socialist party PSOE and of the Communisty party PCE showed much
stronger support for democracy than did members of the right-wing party
Allanza Popular. More specifically, in November 1985 85.9% of the PSOE
and 81.0% of the PCE rated democracy as "good", while only 66.6% of the
14Alfanza Popular rated it as such. This lack of consistent support through­
out the parties is significant, in that a shift in power to the right could 
not only bring policy changes, but also in the most extreme case, such 
as during an economic or military crisis, a change in the basic form of 
government as well.
This naturally leads to the question of how broad the support is 
for the current regime of a constitutional monarchy. When asked in a su r­
vey whether Spain should be a monarchy or a republic, most respondents 
in both 1978 and 1979-80 either were indifferent or did not know. Support 
for both a republic and a monarchy was very weak, with only slightly more 
people in favor of a monarchy (see table7). Vet, despite this apparent 
lack of enthusiasm for a monarchical form of government, in surveys taken 
in the same years the King remained the most popular political figure in 
Spain. As compared to the leaders of the main political parties and to 
Franco himself, the King obtained a mean popularity score of 6.4 In 1978
and6.5 in 1979-80, when measured on a scale of I to 10. The other men re-
15ceived a score of 5.6 or lower. Thus, it seems unclear as to whether 
Juan Carlos1 popularity is simply a reflection of his own personal appeal, 
or whether it can be interpreted more broadly as indicating that Spaniards 
truly do prefer a monarchy over other forms of government. It Is possible 
that, to some extent, support for Juan Carlos results from his strong per­
formance as a leader of the nation rather than from the institution of the 
monarchy itself.
TABLE 7. FORM OF GOVERNMENT PREFERRED.16
Monarchy Republic Indifferent Don't Know
1978 26 % 22 % 35 % 17 %
1979-10 20 18 49 14
Perhaps a closer examination of the King's constituency will pro­
vide greater insight into this dilemma. First of all, the King found his 
strongest support among those who did not know whether elections and a
12
Congress, two very basic institutions of the democratic constitutional 
monarchy, were necessary elements of Spain's political system. Moreover, 
in a multiple regression analysis conducted during this same time period 
it was revealed that out of several different indicators of the King's popu­
larity, religiosity was the most important J 7 From this evidence, the King's 
constituency could be characterized as both religious and politically unaware 
or indifferent. Therefore, it seems probable that their support of Juan 
Carlos is simply a result of their affection for the traditionalism and con­
servatism that the monarchy represents. Although this support for the 
tradition of the monarchy may one day evolve Into support for the consti­
tutional monarchy as a political system, it seems unlikely in this 1978-80 
survey period that the King's popularity was a signal that Spaniards pre­
fer a democratic, monarchical form of government.
One way of clarifying public sentiment toward the monarchical form 
of government is to examine popular opinion of the constitution which un­
derlies it. When a national referendum to ratify the current constitution 
was conducted on December 6, 1978, 88% of those who voted approved the 
document. In more recent polls taken during December 1983 through 
November 1985, the constitution was rated "good" by a majority of about
63%, whereas approximately 23% rated It as average, and roughly 7% found 
19it "bad." However, as in the surveys determining public support of 
democracy, the members of the PSOE and PCE showed consistently 
more favorable attitudes toward the constitution then did the Alianza 
Popular. This again brings into question how stable the majority is 
which now favors the constitution, and what effect, if any, a shift in 
power to the right could have on the contents of the document.
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To gain an even broader view of popular support for the consti 
tution, a review of attitudes toward specific elements within the document 
would be of value. For example, this constitution broke with the Franco 
tradition of permitting only one national movement and instead allows for 
the existence of virtually all parties. This change seemed to enjoy some 
popular backing, for in a 1976 poll taken in four major Spanish cities 43% 
of thost questioned favored legalization of all parties, 24% wanted only cer­
tain parties legalized, and only 3% preferred the single national party sys- 
20ten. Yet, in surveys done in 1978 and 1979-80, when asked which party 
they felt closest to, a majority of respondents in both years answered either 
"none" or "don't know" (see table 8). These polls therefore provide evi­
dence that although Spaniards may be in favor of a multi-party system in 
theory, a majority of them do not convert this belief Into action by becom­
ing affiliated with specific parties.
TABLE 8. REVIEW OF PARTY AFFILIATION21
None Don't Know PSOE
Center Right 
Party UCD PCE Others Righ eg Iona 1
1978 40% 14% 21% 10% 6% 3% 3% ’%
1979-80 54 9 15 9 7 2 3
It has been suggested that one reason for this low ! vel of partisan
ship is the lack of unionization in Spain. Only about 10% of the population
2216 years or older was unionized at the end of tie 1970s. However, a 
strong connection was found between union membership and party affiliation, 
n « If78 poii, 75% of the members of the Social st trade union UCT were 
also members of the Soc ialist party PSOE. Simi arly, 70% of those belonging
14
to the Communist trade union CCOO belonged to either the PCE or the 
PSOE. In contrast, 421 of those respondents who did not belong to a 
trade union also did not affiliate with any party. The low level of par­
ty identification in Spain therefore, is not necessarily a result of disdain 
for the multiple party system provided for by the constitution, but instead 
may be caused by apathy toward joining organizations in general.
A different element of the constitution whose support is perhaps 
more clearly defined is the provision for free elections. In a referendum
conducted in December 1976, 94.2$ of the Spaniards who participated voted
24in favor of free elections, and only 2.6% were opposed. This support 
for elections continued through the following years with 79% of those polled
in 1978 naming free elections Mthe best system11 and only 6% claiming they
25were "not the best system." Thus, there clearly seems to be a mandate 
for free elections in contemporary Spain, whereas during the Franco era 
they did not exist.
Although there was a parliamentary body under the Franco regime, 
it was distinctly different from the one created by the current constitution. 
Under Franco, the Cortes was merely an advisory body, whereas the Cortes 
of contemporary Spain has law-making powers, much like the parliaments of 
other Western democracies. This new democratic institution also has wide­
spread appeal, but it is not quite as popular as are free elections. Public 
opinion polls revealed that in 1978 65% of those asked felt a Congress was
needed, while 10% believed it was not needed and 25% of the respondents 
26did not know. Practically identical results were obtained in the same
survey conducted In 1979-80. Probably support for a Congress would be
15
greater in a more firmly established democracy, such as in the United 
States, but these polls indicate that there definitely is a majority of sup­
port for maintaining a Congress in contemporary Spanish society.
TRENDS
By combining the information from the polls conducted during 
Franco's rule with those taken in the post-Franco era one can detect 
certain trends emerging in Spanish political thought. First, on the most 
basic ievel, there seems to be a definite liberalization of poltical attitudes 
in the period after Franco's death. This is manifested by much broader 
support for democracy as a political system. This trend seems promising 
in terms of the stability of the current liberal, democratic regime. However, 
when the percentages are examined more closely it is apparent that although 
there is a majority in favor of democracy, it is not an overwhelming majority. 
Moreover, Spaniards |pck consensus of support for democracy throughout 
the party system. As was mentioned before, this is important, for a 
change in the primacy of democracy as a political ideology.
A similar lack of party consensus exists in terms of support for 
the constitution which underlies this democratic system. Although in a 
1978 referendum a strong majority of those who voted approved the Con­
stitution, recent surveys have been less positive. Support for the consti­
tution has declined among ail parties, and especially among the members 
of the right-wing party Alianza Popular. As noted earlier, this brings 
into question the stability of a document whose support is so much weaker 
among one of the three major parties. In short, until the Constitution Is 
firmly endorsed by all the parties, elections might hold the possibility of
16
not only a change in leadership and policies, but also a change in the 
constitution itself and the democratic regime it provides.
The trends regarding support for a multiple party system, a basic 
institution of democracy, are somewhat unclear. In the surveys conducted 
during Franco's rule, there was much disagreement over whether the then 
current one party system was best or whether a multiple party system 
should be implemented. In more recent surveys, there has been a shift 
toward favoring the multiple party system over single party rule. But 
there are still few people actually joining parties. Some say this is a re­
sult of lack of interest in joining organizations in general. However, re­
gardless of the cuase of this political apathy, a multiple party system is 
quite ineffective without members to support each group. Thus, although 
there is a trend toward support for a multi-party system in theory, the 
significance of this is uncertain since there is so little participation in 
the system to help develop and strengthen it.
The trends of support for free elections, yet another institution 
of democracy, are less ambiguous. An overwhelming majority of Spaniards 
have expressed their approval of free elections in the post-Franco era. 
Althought abstentions are often high in certain regions, this is not a sign 
of contempt for the electoral process, but instead Is a form of protest.
In fact, by consciously abstaining from voting to make a statement, one 
is, in effect, using elections to voice an opinion, just as those who vote 
do. In essence, Spaniards do appear to prefer having the right to vote 
in free elections which was denied to them during Franco's dictatorship.
17
The final and perhaps most significant trend demonstrated by 
these surveys is that, both during and after the Franco regime, there 
has been a lack of broad consensus as to which form of government is 
best for Spain. In the polls taken during the Franco era there were 
many in fa*.or of haing a republic, even though a monarchy had already 
been chosen as the form of government to succeed the dictatorship. Now 
that a monarchy is in place, there still appears to be little popular back- 
ing for it, with most of those surveyed either indifferent or unsure of 
which type of government is best.
This trend Is significant because Spain has had a history of con­
flict between different factions supporting various forms of government. 
One of the most recent of these conflicts resulted in the Spanish Civil 
War of 1936-1939. This is not to suggest that Spain is on the verge of 
another Civil War, but is it important to note that many of the present- 
day cleavages over Spain's form of government existed in the Civil War 
period as well. A closer examination of the various groups vying for 
power in the mid-l930s will reveal the similarities between the conflicts 
that existed then and the lack of consensus on the form of government 
which exists today in Spain.
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III. Cleavges Over the Form of Government: The Civil War
Some of the social and political conflicts which have led to dis­
agreements over the form of government which Spain should have, date 
back to long before the Civil War period. Conflicts such as those be­
tween the Church and liberals, between the landed aristocracy, the mid- 
cle class, and the peasants, and between the regionalists and centralists 
ists, are virtually as old as the country itself. Yet only within the 
last 50 years have these differences erupted into a conflict which caused 
so much destruction to the land and people of Spain. The number of 
people killed during the Civil War is estimated at nearly 500,000.27
Moreover, approximately 4,250 million pesetas worth of damage was done
28to the property during the War. These statistics reflect not only the 
efficiency of the war machinery used, but also the strength of conviction 
on each side, to be willing to lose so much for the sake of their "cause." 
Each side's "cause" was their perception of how the Spanish state should 
be constituted and governed, and which values should take precedence 
in their preferred political system. These "causes" will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following examination of political cleavages both be­
fore and during the Civil War.
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES BEFORE THE C IV IL  WAR
Between 1931 and 1936 Spain was a republic, with democratic in­
stitutions such as elections, political parties, and an elected parliament.
19
Succeeding the military dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which 
lasted from 1923 until 1930, the regime of the Republic initially enjoyed 
fairly broad support. However, the government of the Republic quick­
ly began to lose favor among the traditional forces in Spain when a con­
stitution was drafted which separated Church and State and decreased 
the ranks of the military elite. The government also failed to deal ef­
fectively with such basic problems as rural poverty and regional ani­
mosities, thereby angering the more liberal and extremist factions as well. 
In short, the conservatives felt the Republic had gone too far in its 
reforms and the liberals believed they hadn't gone far enough. These 
tensions continued to heighten until the differences over how Spain should 
be governed erupted into the Civil War.
The Spanish countryside had long been a source of political un­
rest and the period just before the Civil War was no exception. The ma­
jority of landless laborers and tenant farmers lived in extreme poverty# 
without sufficient food, clothing or shelter. To make matters worse, 
these desperately poor individuals often lived alongside the wealthiest 
landowners whose holdings allowed them to live in the utmost luxury.
These rentiers were men of leisure, living off the rents paid to them by 
the poverty-stricken tenant farmers and showing total disdain for any type 
of manual labor. Frustrated by their seemingly hopeless situation, the 
rural peasants began to view anarchism as a solution. The anarchists 
offered a new social order in which no man would have authority over 
another and In which a more equal distribution of wealth would be guaran­
teed.
20
The rural laborers were further encouraged toward anarchism 
and away from supporting the government of the Republic, as the at­
tempts mode at agrarian reform continued to fail. In two years the
government resettled 12, 260 rural families, yet this was still less than
291% of the total number of poor families needing assistance. The govern­
ment also alienated itself from the rural masses by brutally suppressing 
anarchist strikes. More than once the army or the Civil Guard was 
called in to take the necessary steps to ensure a return to work. In 
essence, the rural population had little incentive to support the Repub­
lic's government, for their situation was not improving under this regime, 
and In many cases it was worsening. They felt justified in advocating a 
new, radical system because only radical change could alter the inequal­
ity that had for so long existed in the countryside.
It should be noted that not ail rural regions had a strong anar­
chist influence. In contrast, the rural lower middle class was quite con­
servative. These small farmers were often religious and therefore great­
ly influenced by the Church. They also tended to be monarchists, and 
advocated the return of King Alfonso who had been forced to leave Spain 
when the Republic was formed. These farmers were, in essence, the mir­
ror Images of the landless or tenant farmers, each representing the op­
posite end of the ideological spectrum.
The ideological differences between these two rural groups could 
also be characterized as regional differences, since the landless peasants 
were concentrated in the south and the farmers with small holdings were 
more numerous in the north. Spain was historically a regionally divided
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nation, with each region having its own traditions and specialties.
This was especially true in the region of Catatonia and in the Basque 
region. These two areas not only had distinct customs, but also had 
distinct languages. They were further distanced from the rest of the 
country because they were so much more advanced industrially. In 
fact, one could saya"dual economy" existed in Spain at this time, with 
these two regions being the most modernized sectors and the majority 
of the country still in an almost pre-industrial stage. These regional 
differences led the Basques and Catalans to demand political autonomy.
In 1932, autonomy was granted to Catalonia, but this action may have 
created more problems than it solved.
The conservatives of Spain, who were generally centralists, 
were outraged at the granting of autonomy to Catalonia. These people 
believed in the sanctity of the unity of the country. They viewed the 
granting of autonomy as a weakening of the state and as an abandon­
ment of the traditions of "Old Spain." The autonomy allowed the Cata­
lans also inflamed the Basques who believed that they too should be per­
mitted to form their own regional government. Although this concession 
may have pacified the Catalans, it caused dissatisfactions and jealousies 
in other areas, thereby creating virtually as much unrest as it had 
calmed.
The conservative forces, headed by the Catholic Church, were 
angered by many provisions in the Republic's constitution in addition to 
the granting of Catalan autonomy. The Church had always been a power­
ful, anti-progressive influence in Spain. Encyclical letters written by
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Pope Leo X IIIin  the late 19th century clearly exemplify this, as he had 
strong reservations about majority rule and criticized the ideologies of 
socialism and anarchism. Instead, he advocated a system in which pri­
vate property, rule of moral law, and the Catholic Church were all of 
primary importance.3® The Church was quite appalled at such liberal 
reforms under the Repubic as the separation of Church and state, the 
institution of a secular school system, and the allowance of civil mar­
riage and divorce. The Church was against the system of Caesaropa- 
pism, in which the state held the full sovereign power. They wanted a 
return to the Old Spain" in which they had an autonomous jurisdiciton 
of their own backed by the monarchy, and it was this desire which 
prompted them to support the uprising to overthrow the Republic.
The political party which perhaps best exemplified the Church's 
point-of-view was the Catholic party CEDA, headed by Gil Robles. "CEDA
reflected the views of landholders, the Catholic middle class, and all those
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who say the danger to Spain as the threat from the Left." Although 
members of this ultra-conservative party held posts in the government of 
the Republic, it was not because they agreed with the Republic's goals 
and policies, but rather because they had hoped to gain power and under­
mine the Republic from within. According to Beevor, Gil Robles openly
stated that if he gained power he would rewrite the Constitution and ere-
32
ate an authoritarian state. However, he never did attain a high enough 
post to institute his changes, so he eventually supported the uprising, 
seeing it as the only viable alternative to the current liberal regime.
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Yet another "right- wing" party which advocated a form of govern­
ment vastly different from that provided by the Republic was the Falange 
Espanola. Founded in 1933 by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the 
deposed dictator, this group was quite unique in its early proposals.
Jos^ Antonio saw the need for radical political and economic changes in 
Spanish society, but instead of supporting the idea of a proletarian revo­
lution to bring about these changes, he believed in their imposition by 
authoritarian means, He proposed that a “creative minority", using na­
tionalism as a motivating ideology, should enforce the changes necessary
33to create a better, more egalitarian state. Of course, this movement 
was anti-liberal in nature since it did not grant any freedom to the masses 
to voice their opinions or to effect change themselves. Syndicates within 
industries and professions, run by elites, would mediate between the peo­
ple and the central authorities. Once the war erupted, the character of 
Falange changed drastically, but it survived, at least in name, to become 
the national party of the Franco regime.
The conservative group which was the backbone of the movement
to overthrow the Republic was, of course, the military. According to
Carr and Fusi, the military " . . .  believed it owed allegiance to the
34nation, not to any government." In short, they viewed themselves as 
custodians of the nation. Therefore, if the government did not act in 
what they perceived as the nation's best interest, they felt justified to 
overthrow it and to institute a more suitable regime. When the Republic 
was in a virtual state of chaos in early 1936, the military saw it as their 
duty to carry out a rebellion and replace the liberal, ineffective Republic 
with a more traditional, authoritarian system of government.
2<t
The rising in July 1936, was not the first attempt at a military 
overthrow of the Republic. In 1932 a coup was organized by General 
Sanjurjo, but this was easily suppressed by a loyal army, not yet dis­
illusioned by the Republic's lack of consensus and inefficiency. Condi­
tions in 1936 however, had greatly deteriorated, with hundreds of strikes 
and political murders occurring throughout the country. Therefore, 
when several generals who had fought in the Moroccan colonial wars 
set out to overthrow the Republic and restore order in Spain, they were 
not easily suppressed. In fact, they were supported by a portion of the 
army and of the population large enough to begin the Civil War.
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES DURING THE C IV IL  WAR
From the previous discussion one might assume that those who 
supported the military rising, the Nationalists, wanted to overthrow the 
liberal regime of the Republic and replace it with a more conservative 
government. It might also be assumed that those who opposed the rebel­
lion, the Republicans simply wanted to retain the Republic as Spain's 
form of government. Yet these are very generalized versions of what 
the many factions within each army were fighting for. The nationalists 
and the Republicans each reprsented a conglomeration of goals and be­
liefs. These diverse ideologies within each side were relatively compat­
ible, but occasionally they competed, reducing the strength and unity 
of that side.
The scenario of competing factions was most common on the Re­
publican side, and perhaps was one of the biggest contributors to their 
defeat. The two main contenders for power were the anarchists and the
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and the communists, with the socialists at times allying with the latter.
The Communist party was controlled by Moscow and that in itself con­
flicted with the independent ideology of the anarchists. The commu­
nists were also a much more pragmatic group, realizing that the top pri­
orities had to be winning the war and restoring order to the country.
In fact, Moscow wanted to restore a liberal democracy instead of imple­
menting a Communist state, because they felt that Spain was not yet 
ready for such a revolution.
This ideology sharply contrasted with that of the anarchists.
They believed that the social revolution must take place during the war, 
for if it did not, victory would be meaningless. Therefore, in anarchist 
strongholds, such as Catalonia, industries were taken over by workers' 
collectives and farms were also widely collectivized. This reduced the 
strength of the Republicans, not only because they were fragmented 
ideologically, but also because many of these collectives did not cooperate 
with the central government in Madrid, in paying taxes and sending sup­
plies. The anarchists viewed the leaders in Madrid as communists, and 
therefore as adversaries, when in reality they were only easing the vic­
tory of their true, more dangerous adversaries.
This struggle between communists and anarchists was further re­
flected in the divisions within the Republican armed forces: CNT militias, 
which were militias formed by members of the anarchist trade union, chose 
to remain independent from the rest of the army, weakening the unity of 
the Republican forces. Moreover, the air force was ideologically more 
communist than the army or the navy because they had the closest con­
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tact with the Russians who trained and supplied them.^7 In essence, the 
animosities between these two factions ove» what form of government 
should prevail contributed to weakening the element most crucial to the 
Republican struggle--their armed forces.
The Basque territory of the north, which was Republican-controlled 
for most of the war, represented still another view of what type of govern­
ment should rule Spain. Being a conservative and religious people, the 
Basques did not advocate any form of social revolution. They simply 
wanted a traditional government in which they would be granted autonomy. 
In fact, during the war they were allowed to form their own regional 
government. It was this concession which kept them loyal to the Republi­
can cause, because in terms of general attitudes, they were more compat­
ible with those groups fighting on the Nationalist side. Although they 
were removed from the anarchsit-communist struggle which had created 
so much disunity the Basques' desire for separatism in itself further 
weakened and fragmented the Republican cause.
There was less dissention on the Nationalist side simply because 
it was not allowed. As soon as a territory was conquered, martial law 
was imposed, thereby limiting the opportunity for any type of protest.
In addition, the two dominant political parties, the Carlists and the 
Falange, had been unified by Franco in April 1937, eliminating the de­
structive effects of party competition displayed on the Republican side. 
Finally, the Church was a unifying force for the Nationalists, binding 
all Catholics behind their cause.
it should be noted hov.ever, that differing ideologies did still
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exist in Nationalist territory, some more blatantly than others. For ex­
ample, General Mola who headed the Army of the North, was alleged to
have advocated the installation of a republican dictatorship with separa-
39tion of Church and state. Quiepo de Llano, the flamboyant wartime
leader of Seville was a freemason, and often ended his nightly radio
39broadcasts with the phrase, "Long live the Republic." In addition, 
it was commonly believed that the Carlists still wanted a royal. Catholic 
dictatorship headed by a Carlist monarch. And, of course, the Falange 
advocated a form of government far different than the one being imposed 
in Nationalist territory during the war. Yet, these differing views of 
how Spain should be governed never significantly weakened the National­
ists because the fear inspired by the brutality of Franco's forces kept 
people from rebelling against the wartime government, even if they were 
displeased with its form. In fact, this use of fear and repression was 
continued by Franco long after the war was over so his rule would re­
main strong and unchallenged.
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IV . Franco's Authoritarian Reginu
The Civil War ended in late March 1939 but for those on the losing 
side, peace did not come until long after that date. Hundreds of thou­
sands of Republicans who were lucky enough to have been able to flee 
the country faced hunger, disease, and overcrowing in the refugee camps 
Into which they were herded. Even more tragic was the fate of the Re­
publicans trapped in Spain after the Nationalist victory, for they were 
brutally persecuted by Franco and his troops Some were sent to pri­
son camps to serve sentences of several years in length, while others
were summarily executed. Hugh Thomas estimates that in Barcelona
40alone there were 300 executions per week during May 1939. Although 
these political killings and imprisonments eventually subsided, the author­
itarian regime which stabilized under Franco's rule remained repressive 
and overbearing in other less blatant, yet equally significant ways.
One element of this repression was the denial of basic political 
rights, such as the right to vote. Throughout most of Franco's rule 
only syndicates or municipalities could elect ministers to the Spanish
parliament called the Cortes, thereby excluding the individual citizen
41from the electoral process. After 1969 suffrage was expanded to include
62heads of families as wail. Yet this liberalization did not, in fact, con­
tribute to the establishment of a more representative government, since 
the Cortes remained merely an advisory body with little or no decision­
making power. The ministers with any influence ware appointed by Franco
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himself, and they felt no real obligation to respond to the will of the pub­
lic.
Basic civil liberties were also supended during the Franco era, 
such as freedom of expression. The mass media was closely car.1 sored so 
that material which seemed to conflict with the political or moral values of 
"the movement" was not given public exposure. As a result, newspapers 
only contained articles praising the regime or criticizing some opponent 
of the regime, and failed to serve as reliable sources of information. 
Censors often deleted or changed entire scenes from foreign films to com­
ply with the morality code of the Catholic Franco state. Yet this tamper­
ing tended to result in the changing or confusing of the original story­
line of the film. So,, in an effort to curtail the dissemination of subversive 
or immoral material, the censors of the Franco government often denied ac­
cess to cultural and informational material vital to the political and social 
development of the Spanish people.
The freedom of association, another basic democratic liberty, was 
also disallowed under Franco's rule. Workers' unions were declared ille­
gal after 1939 and were eventually replaced by Falange's vertical syndi­
cates. These syndicates, which included both employers and workers, 
did not properly represent workers' interests and instead were Just a 
means of pacifying the Falangists who had been denied any real power 
in government. Other associatonal groups, such as politcal parties, were 
also declared illegal by Franco. He believed parties were responsible for 
the downfall of the Republic and claimed therefore, that in the interest 
of national unity, parties should be outlawed. The only associational 
groupings encouraged at this time were those not related to workers'
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rights or politics, such as the family,Church or economic interest groups 
like Chambers of Commerce. As Juan Linz explains, the existence of 
these autonomous groups distinguishes Franco's authoritarian dictator­
ship from totalitarian regimes such as Stalin's Ruisia, in which no autono-
43mo us organizations were allowed. It should be stressed however, that 
the pluralism of Franco's Spain was strictly limited to specific groups, and 
therefore, freedom of association was generally denied to the Spanish pub­
lic.
Although the existence of prohibitions against political parties, 
unions,critical publications, etc., deterred most people from any subver­
sive political activity, there were still some who tried to protest. Yet 
the punishments for disobeying these laws were very real, and in some 
cases, quite severe. Punishments ranged from withdrawal of passports 
or drivers' licenses to large fines or even imprisonment. For example, 
in January 1970, two people were sentenced to serve 4 yeras and 2 months 
in prison for organizing workers' commissions.**** In that same month a
lawyer was sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of 10,000 pesetas
45for possessing communist propaganda material. These types of cases 
may not have been common occurrences, however they serve to illustrate 
that the Franco government took the issue of illegal political activism very 
seriously, and that this government was willing to use extreme measures 
to curtail it.
The result of this strict enforcement of the laws prohibiting po­
litical activism was a marked depoilticization of the Spanish public. This 
apathy is exactly what Franco had hoped to achieve, for without the
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public's involvement in political activities, such as parties, his rule could 
remain unchallenged until his death. Instead of concerning themselves 
with political issues, most Spaniards became part of what Raymond Carr
H C
calls the "culture of evasion." By this, Carr is referring to the fact 
that Spaniards became more involved in such activities as watching foot-* 
ball matches, listening to radio serials, or watching television, thereby 
diverting their attention from political issues. The rapid industrializa­
tion of Spain during Franco's rule, which provided more consumer goods, 
served to further increase this political complacency. In short, the deni­
al of political freedom combined with the "culture of evasion" and the 
satisfaction of the consumer society set in motion a trend of political 
apathy during the Franco era which is still evident ten years after his 
death. This was demonstrated by the survey results discussed in section 
II, in which large percentages of the population shewed indifference or 
uncertainty toward the current form of government and its institutions, 
this apathy will not be helpful for the future development of Spanish 
democracy.
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V. Conclusion
The political apathy which exists in Spain today is not unique to 
that country alone, veil-established democracies, such as the United 
States, are also experiencing apathy among their citizenry, with low 
voter turn-out and little Interest in political parties, in the U.S., popu­
lar notions have evolved such as Hall politicans are corrupt11 or "one 
vote cannot make a difference," and these have served to reinforce the 
the lack of participation in the political process. Yet despite the apathy 
and cynicism of the American public, there still remains a strong commit­
ment to the ideals of democracy as a political system. It is this commit­
ment that insures that regardless of who votes or who is elected, democ­
racy will continue to be the preferred form of government in the 
United States. The same may not be true in Spain. After ten years of 
a democratically-oriented constitutional monarchy, it still seems question­
able whether democracy has been sufficiently institutionalized or whether 
it will be replaced by a different form of government in the future. This 
has been the central issue of this investigation, and although no defini­
tive answers can be offered at this time, certain conclusions can be drawn 
from the materiel presented.
First of all, there is evidence to support the notion that Spain will 
continue as a democracy in the near future. Public opinion polls in the 
post-Franco era show a definite trend toward increasing support for democ­
racy as a political system, and for the democratic institutions which are a 
part of this system. As mentioned earlier, during the Franco regime
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Spaniards generally preferred authoritarianism over democracy. In the 
more recent surveys however, democracy was rated "good11 by a majori­
ty of respondents. Most respondents in recent surveys also showed sup­
port for such elements of democracy as a parliament, a multi-party system, 
mad free elections. Based on this data alone one might conclude that the 
future of Spanish democracy is very promising.
Additional evidence, however, indicates that the continuance of a 
democratic system in Spain is not completely assured. For example, al­
though there is a majority of support for democracy and its institutions, 
this majority is not overwhelming. Whereas In the United States the con­
stitution and the democratic system would probably receive strong appro­
val from about 90-90% of the respondents In a given survey, in Spain 
they are only supported by about 60-70% of those questioned. Moreoever, 
this democratic support is not consistent throughout the party system. 
Members of the communist and socialist parties show much more enthusiasm 
for democracy and the constitution than do members of the conservative 
party. Finally, democracy does not appear to be firmly institutionalized 
because there is so little participation in the political process and so little 
party Identification. This apathy was acceptable, and even preferable 
during the authoritarian rule of Franco, but now it can only serve to 
hinder the development of Spanish democracy.
It will be interesting to watch the evolution of Spain1 s system of 
government in the coming decade. Recent events, such as a coup attempt 
In 1981 and several terrorist bombings perpetrated by the Basque separa­
tist movement in the past few eyars, highlight the fact that there are 
still certain elements greatly dissatisfied with the current form of govern­
3ft
ment. Just as in the pre-Civi! War period, there are cleavages between 
such groups as liberals and conservatives, and regionalists and central­
ists, over which form of government should rule Spain. Whether these 
cleavages will impede the continuity of the process of institutionalizing 
democracy still remains to be seen. However, from the evidence presented 
in this paper, it seems certain that this process of democratic institutional­
ization is not yet complete, and is therefore still in danger of being dis­
rupted.
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